Suchergebnisse

Seit langem ist empirisch belegt, dass Kinder aus höheren sozialen Schichten im Durchschnitt bessere Schulleistungen erbringen und dass sie dann - auf Grund der besseren schulischen Leitungen - häufiger ein Hochschulstudium anstreben und auch abschließen als Kinder aus den unteren Schichten. R. Bouden hat diesen Sachverhalt bei seiner Analyse (1974) ungleicher Bildungschancen den primären und sekundären Effekt genannt. Der vorliegende Beitrag zur sozialen Selektion des Bildungs- und Schulwesen stellt eine vergleichende Studie vor, die belegt, dass in Schweden die Ungleichheit bei den Bildungschancen im Vergleich zu Daten aus Großbritannien reduziert worden ist. Der Vergleich verschiedener Alters- und Schulklassenkohorten bestätigt und erweitert zugleich das Wissen über das Funktionieren von primären und sekundären Effekten bei der sozialen Selektion von Lebenschancen und -verläufen. (ICA). Die Untersuchung enthält quantitative Daten. Die Untersuchung bezieht sich auf den Zeitraum 1968 bis 1990.

An increased interest in the social class position of women has followed the increased labour force participation of married women. But if more than one member of a family is assigned a class position independently of the other members, the two basic factors of class position, according to Lockwood, work situation and market situation, do not necessarily coincide, since the work situation relates uniquely to the individual, while the market situation refers to the family or household. It is suggested that work position, based on the occupations of individuals, should be used as an indicator of the work situation, and that class position, based on information about the occupations of those family members who carry the economic responsibility of the household, should be used as the indicator of the market situation. A way for ascribing a class position to families, and thereby to family members, is developed. It utilizes the work positions of both spouses and is based on an order of dominance, where occupations high in this order are presumed to influence the market situation of the family more than occupations of lower levels. Class positions of single individuals or families are thought to be rather stable over time. Although women are shown to have looser attachments to the labour market, we do not find more intragenerational mobility among women than among men, neither in terms of work position nor in terms of class.

This article analyzes voting for Congress in presidential election years. The national Democratic vote for the House increases with the Democratic vote for president but decreases with the Democrats' perceived chances of winning the presidency (anticipatory balancing). The evidence for coattails and for balancing become visible only when statistically controlling for the other. The aggregate evidence for coattails and balancing in presidential years is reinforced by the analysis of National Election Studies (NES) survey respondents. That analysis shows that politically informed voters are more likely to vote for Congress against the party that they believe will win the presidency.

The growing concern about economic inequality leads to a similar concern about political inequality. This article explores the seeming contradiction between the literature pointing to inequality in political representation in the United States and the literature showing that public policy does tend to represent public opinion in general. Low-income voters are much less likely to vote or to be politically knowledgeable than high-income voters, which limits their influence and creates an upper-income bias to effective public opinion. Considerable research suggests that low-income voters' opinions count for even less than would be implied by their low participation rate, a matter that should continue to be the subject of research. Seemingly contrary to any upper-income bias to policy making, major legislation usually moves policy in the direction favored by low-income voters (e.g., redistribution, government programs). Upper-income voters and interest groups, however, are able to slow the pace of liberal change.